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Abstract 
Scientific models need to be investigated if they are to provide valuable information 
about the systems they represent. Surprisingly, the epistemological question of what 
enables this investigation has hardly been investigated. Even authors who consider the 
inferential role of models as central, like Hughes (1997) or Bueno and Colyvan (2011), 
content themselves with claiming that models contain mathematical resources that 
provide inferential power. We claim that these notions require further analysis and ar-
gue that mathematical formalisms contribute to this inferential role. We characterize 
formalisms, illustrate how they extend our mathematical resources, and highlight how 
distinct formalisms offer various inferential affordances. 
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1. Introduction. When analyzing scientific representations, philosophers of science 
are keen on mentioning that some models provide scientists with “mathematical re-
sources” and “inferential power”, but they seldom give a detailed analysis of these no-
tions. This paper is devoted to the discussion of what appears to us as major mathe-
matical resources, namely, formalisms. We thus present an analysis of the notion of 
formalism as well as examples from which we argue that formalisms should be ac-
knowledged as major units of scientific activity. 
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we briefly review what philosophers of science 
have to say about mathematical resource and inferential power and observe that it is 
disappointing. In order to fill the gap we have identified, we put forward in Section 3 
the three components we identify within the notion of mathematical resource. Section 
4 is devoted to one of these components, namely, formalism. At last, in Section 5, we 
provide the reader with examples of how the choice of a formalism influences the type 
of knowledge scientists may draw from their representations. 
2. Scientific representations and inferences therefrom. At what conditions can sci-
entific models be used to gain information about target systems? First, a suitable se-
mantic relation between the model and the system(s) that it stands for should obtain, 
so that by investigating the model, we can make legitimate inferences about its target 
system(s). This cannot be done unless nontrivial inferences about the model itself, as a 
mathematical object, can be carried out. Models are usually referred to by proper 
names (like “Ising model” or “Lotka-Volterra” model”) or by expressions that high-
light some of their mathematical properties (like “the harmonic oscillator” or “the ide-
al gas”). There is however more to be learnt about them than their prima facie proper-
ties. For example, solving the Ising model reveals more about Ising-like systems than 
their description as “sets of discrete variables representing magnetic dipole moments 
of atomic spins that can be in one of two states”; similarly, the mathematical content of 
an harmonic oscillator goes beyond “being a system that, when displaced from its 
equilibrium position, experiences a restoring force that is proportional to the displace-
ment”. Philosophers of science are aware of the need to investigate the epistemology 
of models and how we find out about concealed truths about model systems (Frigg, 
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2010, 257) but are surprisingly silent about how it is actually performed.  They are 1
content with saying that the model is “manipulated” (Morgan and Morrison, 1997, 
chapter 2, passim) or that we can “play” with it (Hughes, 2010, 49), which are sugges-
tive, but metaphoric characterizations. 
Surprisingly, even accounts of applied mathematics and scientific representation that 
give central stage to their inferential role hardly analyze how it is fulfilled and which 
elements of the models contribute to it. Let us illustrate this point with Bueno’s and 
Colyvan’s work. They claim that “the fundamental role of applied mathematics is in-
ferential" (Bueno and Colyvan, 2011, 352) and accordingly propose an “inferential 
conception" of the application of mathematics that extends Hughes’ three-step DDI 
account of scientific representation (see below).  First, a "mapping from the empirical 2
set up to a convenient mathematical structure” (ibidem, 353) is established (immersion 
step); by doing so, it becomes possible “to obtain inferences that would otherwise be 
extraordinarily hard (if not impossible) to obtain” (ibidem, 352) (derivation step); fi-
nally, the mathematical consequences that were obtained are interpreted step in terms 
of the initial empirical set up (ibidem, 353) (interpretation step). Bueno and Colyvan 
further highlight the importance of the inferential role of mathematics for mathemati-
cal unification, novel predictions by mathematical reasoning or mathematical explana-
tions (ibidem, 363). However, the analysis of how this inferential role is carried out 
shines by its absence. Bueno and Colyvan mostly analyze mathematical resources in a 
semantic perspective  and insist on the difference in content and interpretation that 3
these make possible, e.g., when “mathematics provides additional entities to quantify 
 Frigg, while clearly stating the problem, does not really address it and is content with 1
briefly emphasizing the advantages of his fictional account of model concerning the 
epistemology of models (Frigg, 2010). As to the epistemological section of Frigg and 
Hartmann’s review article about scientific models, it merely points at experiments, si-
mulations, thought-experiment as ways of investigating models (Frigg and Hartmann, 
2017).
 Suarez’s inferential conception (Suarez, 2004) hardly addresses either the question 2
of how inferences from models are actually carried out. For lack of space, we shall not 
discuss it here.
 Their discussion is mostly directed at the shortcomings of Pincock’s “mapping ac3 -
count” of the application of mathematics (Pincock, 2004).
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over” (complex numbers), or is “the source of interpretations that are physically mean-
ingful” and provide “novel prediction” about physical systems, like with the case of 
the interpretation of negative energy solutions to Dirac’s equation (ibidem, 366). 
In another paper, Bueno suggests that results are derived “by exploring the mathe-
matical resources of the model” in which features of the empirical set up are immersed 
(Bueno, 2014, 379, see also 387) and that results emerge “as a feature of the mathe-
matics” (ibidem) or by using “the particular mathematical framework” (ibidem, 385). 
What this inferential power of mathematics should be specifically ascribed to remains 
unclear. Bueno and Colyvan (2011, 352) just claim that the “embedding into a mathe-
matical structure makes it is possible to obtain inferences”. They also emphasize how, 
with the help of appropriate idealizations, “the mathematical model [can] directly 
[yield] the results” (ibidem, 360, our emphasis). But elsewhere in the paper, conse-
quences are said to be drawn “from the mathematical formalism, using the mathemati-
cal structure obtained in the immersion step” (ibidem, 353, our emphasis). 
What are we to make of these various claims? A prima facie plausible answer to this 
question might be that structures and formalisms are the two sides of a same inferen-
tial coin. However, this answer is not satisfactory, since, as is well-known, mathemati-
cal structures can be presented in different formalisms, which, as we shall see in Sec-
tion 4, are associated with different inferential possibilities. Another blind spot in 
Bueno’s and Colyvan’s account is that while the derivation step is claimed to be “the 
key point of the application process, where consequences from the mathematical for-
malism are generated’’ (ibidem, 353), the question of how inferences are drawn with 
the help of formalisms is left under-discussed. 
We draw from this brief analysis of Bueno’s and Colyvan’s views that the notions of 
mathematical resource and inferential power, which are commonly used when dis-
cussing applications of mathematics, are often mere labels in need of further investiga-
tion. Coming back to the seminal ideas presented by Hughes and extended by Bueno 
and Colyvan is of little help because Hughes’ paper lacks precise answers to the fol-
lowing precise questions: What are exactly mathematical resources? What is their in-
ferential power? In his DDI (Denotation, Demonstration, and Interpretation) account 
of scientific representation, Hughes claims that scientific representations have an ‘‘in-
ternal dynamic’’, whose effects we can examine (1997, 332), and “contain resources 
which enable us to demonstrate the results we are interested in”. A general notion of 
resource is appropriate to capture the variety of ways in which demonstrations can be 
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carried out; however, the claim that the deductive power comes from “the deductive 
resources of mathematics they employ” (ibidem, 332) is too vague and is left unana-
lyzed.  
3. Components of mathematical resources. How are the notions of inferential power 
and mathematical resources to be analyzed? Are they linked to structures or to symbo-
lic systems and formalisms? In this section, we claim that formalisms are an important 
component of the notions of inferential power and mathematical resource and should 
be analyzed in their own right. 
Let us begin by briefly presenting what are, according to us, the three main compo-
nents of the notions of mathematical resource and associated inferential power. First, 
mathematical structures, to the extent that they are tractable, are undoubtedly an im-
portant part of the mathematical resources that are used in mathematical modeling. As 
argued by Cartwright, theories are no “vending machines” that “drop out the sought-
for representation" (1999, 247); scientific models are no vending machines either and 
scientists must make the best of the models that they know to be tractable. According-
ly, the content of models often needs to be adapted by means of idealizations, approx-
imations (Redhead 1980), abstractions, by squeezing representations into the straight-
jacket of a few elementary models (Cartwright, 1981), or by drawing, from the start, 
on the pool of existing tractable models (Humphreys, 2004, Barberousse and Imbert, 
2014). 
Second, mathematical knowledge associated with structures is also to be counted as 
a distinct mathematical resource, which allows for new inferences when it is available. 
Let us take the well-known example of Koenigsberg’s seven bridges. The impossibility 
of crossing them once and only once in a single trip can be demonstrated by applying a 
result from graph theory. Similarly, the explanation of the life-cycle of the Magicicada 
(Baker 2009, Colyvan 2018) is provided by the application of a number-theoretic 
property of prime numbers to life-cycles of species. 
At last, formal settings or formalisms provide languages in which theories are devel-
oped, calculations carried out, and inferences drawn from models. Examples of for-
malisms are Hamiltonian formalism, path integrals, Fourier representation, cellular 
automata, etc. We provide a detailed analysis of some of these below. Contrary to 
mathematical structures, formalisms are partly content neutral (though form and con-
tent are often intertwined in scientific representations). As providing a partially stan-
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dardized way of making inferences, they are important tools for scientists, which in 
turn justifies considering them as important units of analysis in the philosophy of sci-
ence. Other authors have started exploring the idea that format matters in scientific 
activities. Humphreys gives general arguments to this effect and emphasizes the dif-
ference between formats that are appropriate for human-made and format that suit 
computational inferences (2004). Vorms (2009) also emphasizes the general impor-
tance of formats of representation when toying with theories or models. Formalisms 
are a specifically mathematical type of format whose role needs further investigation. 
This is what we do in the next section. 
4. What are formalisms? As briefly stated above, formalisms are mathematical lan-
guages that allow one to present mathematical statements or objects and draw infer-
ences about them by means of general inference rules. For example, Hamiltonian for-
malism is one of the formalisms through which scientists may find out means to solve 
differential equations. Path integrals is another formalism of this kind, with the help of 
which one may also solve (partial) differential equations. Let us illustrate the latter 
point further: the integral solution of the Schrödinger equation requires using a math-
ematical object, the propagator, whose calculation the path integrals formalism makes 
easier. Fourier representation or formalism enables one to represent mathematical 
functions as the continuous sum of sine functions (or complex exponential functions), 
so that harmonic analysis, i.e. the decomposition of a signal in its harmonic frequen-
cies, may be performed. It also provides modelers with a way to express the solutions 
of some partial differential equations, such as the heat equation. Finally, formalisms 
like numerical integrators, cellular automata, lattice Boltzmann methods, and discrete 
variational integrators, are indispensable in current computational science.  
Formalisms consist in the following elements: 
i. elementary symbols; 
ii. syntax rules that determine the set of well-formed expressions; 
iii. inference rules; 
iv. a partly detachable interpretation, both mathematical and physical. 
Their use is facilitated by  
v. translation rules that indicate how to shift from one formalism to another. 
Let us illustrate these elements by discussing in more detail the above examples. In 
the Hamiltonian formalism, elementary symbols are used for a variable and its conju-
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gate momentum: “(q, p)”, or for Poisson brackets ‘’{.,.}’'. Among the syntax rules that 
are specific to Hamiltonian formalism, some allow one to rewrite Hamilton equations 
by using the canonical variables. Inferences rules allow the users to use action-angle 
variables (I, theta) and to solve equations by using these coordinates because this 
change of variables opens the possibility to deal with integrable systems, thus provid-
ing a systematic method to solve exactly, i.e., in closed forms, differential systems like 
the simple pendulum, and more generally, any 1D-conservative system. Indeed, due to 
this change of variables, one takes full advantage of the existence of conserved quanti-
ties in mechanical systems, which are then used as variables (actions) in Hamilton 
equations. This allows constructing the solution of the equations by “quadrature’' (Ba-
belon et al. 2003, chapter 2). An example of a translation rule is the Legendre trans-
form that allows one to shift to Lagrangian formalism. Similarly, in the case of Fourier 
transforms, an elementary specific symbol is f^, which corresponds to the Fourier 
transform of the function f. Scientists use sets of rules that describe the Fourier trans-
forms of some typical functions, such as the constant function, the unit step function, 
and the sinusoids, but also rules for the convolution product, viz. the Fourier transform 
of the convolution f o g is the product of Fourier transforms of f and g: (f o g)^  = f^. 
g^,  so that solutions of equations may be found within Fourier space. An inverse 
Fourier transform is also defined, which enables one to move back from the Fourier 
transform f^ to the function f (this is again a translation rule). 
As emphasized above, formalisms are (partly) content neutral and thus “exportable”, 
even though they usually come with a privileged physical interpretation. As a matter of 
fact, most formalisms have been developed within a peculiar modeling context or are 
linked to a physical theory. From this origin, the most successful ones may become 
autonomous and depart from their original, physical interpretation. For example, 
Hamiltonian formalism was initially developed in the context of classical mechanics 
but is nowadays autonomous and used in other physical contexts. Path integrals origi-
nally come from the study of Brownian motion (Wiener 1923) and quantum mechanics 
(Feymann 1942) but are currently used in other fields like field theory and financial 
modeling. 
The mathematical interpretation of formalisms may sometimes be detachable. For 
example, the transition rules associated with cellular automata (see below) do not have 
any obvious mathematical interpretation. Further, although some formalisms are lin-
ked to acknowledged mathematical theories (e.g.,  the Fourier formalism is linked to 
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the theory of  complex functions), they differ from genuine mathematical theories, as 
shown by the example of path integrals, in which the formalism is used in the absence 
of any uncontroversial mathematical theory that could back it up. The definition of a 
path integral: 
 
requires using a measure “Dx’', to which no general, rigorous definition can be given 
yet. This mathematical concern does not prevent physicists from using path integrals 
anyway, as testified by the following quote: “The question of how the path integral is 
to be understood in full generality remains open. Given this, one might expect to see 
the physicists expending great energy trying to clarify the precise mathematical mean-
ing of the path integral. Curiously, we again find that this is not the case” (Davey 
2003, 450). 
Let us finally emphasize that formalisms also differ from formulations of physical 
theories and allow philosophers of science to address different philosophical problems. 
Formulations of theories, in particular axiomatic ones, are explored when questions 
about conceptual content and metaphysical implications are raised. They pertain to 
foundational issues. Whether a given formulation involves calculus is a peripheral is-
sue in this context. By contrast, the primary virtue of a formalism is to allow modelers 
to draw actual inferences from a theory or model. The inferential rules it contains are 
more important than the mathematical rigor of the language in which it is expressed. 
5. Choosing a formalism. So far, we have argued that the inferential power that is re-
quired to explore models is partly brought about by formalisms, and we have given 
examples thereof. Accordingly, formalisms have to be carefully examined by philoso-
phers of science if they are to provide a fine-grained analysis of how scientific knowl-
edge is produced in practice. We now aim to show that there is no unique description 
of formalism-rooted inferential power since different formalisms allow for different 
types of inferences and are adapted to different types of inquiries. We do so by provid-
ing examples of these differences and of the factors that guide scientists when choos-
ing the formalism that is best suited to the task at hand. 
How do scientists decide which formalism to use in a given inquiry? The choice may 
first depend on the type of models at hand. For example, the path integral formalism is 
K(b,a) = e
2 iπ
h Ldttb
ta
∫
a
b
∫ Dx(t)
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well adapted to solve systems with many degrees of freedom (Zinn-Justin 2009) and 
makes ‘‘certain numerical calculations in quantum mechanics more tractable’’ (Davey 
2003, 449). Lagrangian formalism offers a well-suited framework to solve equations 
describing constrained systems (Goldstein 2002, 13, Vorms 2009, 15). Fourier repre-
sentation allows one to solve, e.g., the differential equations describing the time evolu-
tion of electrical quantities in networks. In this case, differential equations are trans-
formed into algebraic equations on variables in Fourier space, which may be easier to 
solve. Finally, with the change of action-angle variables, Hamiltonian formalism po-
tentially provides exact solutions for integrable systems, which have as many indepen-
dent conserved quantities as degrees of freedom. 
The use of a particular formalism is also guided by epistemic goals. Depending on 
the chosen formalism, different kinds of properties, general (e.g. periodicity, symme-
try) or particular (dynamical), may be inferred from the same model. Let us illustrate 
this point with the example of prey-predator models in ecology. Among these, some 
obey Lotka-Volterra (LV) equations and represent transforming populations with a sys-
tem of two coupled equations. If they are investigated within the Hamilton formalism, 
general properties of these models can be found without setting initial conditions or 
numerical values for the involved parameters. The reframed models can indeed be 
shown to be integrable, like the simple pendulum in classical mechanics. Dutt explicit-
ly emphasizes the advantages of using this formalism for a two-species LV system:  
‘‘In dealing with the problems involving periodicity, the Hamilton-Jacobi 
canonical theory has a distinct advantage over the conventional methods of 
classical mechanics. In this approach, one introduces action and angle vari-
ables through canonical transformations in such a way that the angle variable 
becomes cyclic. One then obtains the frequency of oscillation by taking the 
derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to the action variable. One may 
thus bypass the difficulty in obtaining the complete solutions of the equations 
of motion, if these are not required.’’ (Dutt, 1976, 460, our emphasis) 
LV models can also be solved with the help of computers and generic numerical in-
tegrators when the aim is to obtain particular dynamics for specific values of parame-
ters and initial conditions. Such numerical solutions of the LV model can also be pro-
vided by specific formalisms, such as discrete variational integrators (Krauss 2017, 34; 
Tyranowski 2014, 149). In that case, discrete equations are derived from a discrete 
least action principle, which is well-suited to conservative systems, like the LV sys-
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tem. Discrete variational integrators allow for the preservation of general properties 
like the conservation of global quantities, viz. energy, momenta, and symplecticity. 
This discrete formalism comes with mathematical constraints on the discretization of 
time since the time step has to be adaptive in order to guarantee the conservation of 
global quantities (Marsden & West 2001, Section 4.1). 
Finally, let us mention that LV models can also be studied by using cellular au-
tomata (CA) and associated formalism, with the following advantages: 
[a rather general predator-prey model] is formulated in terms of automata 
networks, which describe more correctly the local character of predation than 
differential equations. An automata network is a graph with a discrete variable 
at each vertex which evolves in discrete time steps according to a definite rule 
involving the values of neighboring vertex variables. (Ermentrout and Edem-
stein-Keshet 1993, 106)  
On the one hand, CA are discrete dynamical systems, but on the other, they are also a 
nice means to practice science with the help of a computationally simple formalism (in 
terms of transition rules). They can be extremely powerful. For example, rule 110 is 
Turing complete and, like lambda-calculus, can emulate any Turing machine and 
therefore complete any computation. In contrast with the case of Hamilton formalism, 
CA-based inferences from prey-predator models are carried out for specific values and 
parameters. As CA are described by local rules, these inferences merely pertain to lo-
cal variations in the model. However, the simplicity of these rules is a tremendous ad-
vantage for modeling and code-writing. For instance, CA allow one to easily add rules 
for the pursuit and evasion of populations as well as rules for age variation (Boccara et 
al. 1993, Ermentrout and Edemstein-Keshet 1993, see also Barberousse and Imbert 
2013 for an analysis of CA as used in fluid dynamics and compared with Navier-
Stokes based methods). 
Let us now turn to a different example illustrating how different the epistemological 
effects of using this or that formalism may be. Crystals are currently modeled as lat-
tices that come under two forms, lattices in real space and lattices in reciprocal space. 
Each is associated with a specific formalism. Within the real space lattice formalism, 
crystals are described with a vector R expanded on a vector basis (a1, a2, a3) which cor-
responds to crystal directions, and alpha, beta, gamma are the corresponding angles. 
Inferences about symmetry of crystals are usually made within this type of representa-
tion since the real space is well adapted to studying discrete translations and rotations. 
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Crystals can also be described with the help of a vector R* in a lattice in reciprocal 
space. There is a clear correspondence between the two spaces since they are dual. 
Given R in the real space, we can derive R* in the reciprocal space, and conversely. 
The two spaces are related by a Fourier transform. However, the reciprocal space can 
be more convenient because inferences about diffraction and interference patterns are 
easier to carry out in the Fourier representation. As stressed by Hammond in a text-
book of crystallography: 
the reciprocal lattice is the basis upon which the geometry of X-ray and elec-
tron diffraction patterns can be most easily understood and […] the electron 
diffraction patterns observed in the electron microscope, or the X-ray dif-
fraction patterns recorded with a precession camera, are simply sections 
through the reciprocal lattice of a crystal (Hammond 2009, 165). 
This example shows that facilitating inferences may have various epistemological 
effects. Some are relevant to computational aspects and the predictions or explanations 
that scientists are able to produce in practice. Others pertain to the way scientists un-
derstand and reason about models and their target systems. This example also shows 
how different epistemic goals (symmetry-oriented vs. interference-oriented investiga-
tions of crystals) determine which formalism is chosen. 
Overall, the above shows that formalisms not only have an important impact on the 
amount of results scientists may produce, but also on the types of results that are at-
tainable. The examples we have discussed also highlight that the existence of a variety 
of formalisms is a source of epistemic richness and enhanced inferential power for sci-
entists because it provides them with multiple ways of investigating the same mathe-
matical structures or structures that are related by suitable morphisms. 
6. Conclusion. The above proposals are meant to contribute to the epistemological 
question of what provides models with inferential power and helps scientists succeed-
ing in their inquiries. We have shown that some of this inferential power is brought 
about by the formal symbolic tools that scientists use to present and investigate math-
ematical models. Our second claim is that all formal settings do not enable the same 
types of inferences nor are suited to all epistemic goals. Accordingly, a fine-grained 
analysis of the conditions of scientific progress needs, among other things, to focus on 
formalisms. 
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Our epistemological analysis is not tied to any particular theory of scientific repre-
sentation. However, by showing that inferences actually hinge on choice of formalism, 
it suggests that a theory of scientific representation that is cashed out in terms of struc-
tures is too abstract to account for the various ways equations are solved in practice 
and information extracted from scientific models. 
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